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ORANGE IS FOREVER THE NEW BLACK: THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS QUASHED FOR MONTANA FELONS IN VAN DER
HULE V. HOLDER
Paige Griffith
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Montana automatically restores felons’ gun rights
once they complete their underlying sentences, so long as the crimes for
which they were sentenced did not involve a dangerous weapon.1
However, in Van der hule v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stripped those gun rights under federal statute.2
II. A QUICK HISTORY OF FELON GUN CONTROL
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,”3 but the
government has had “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons[.]”4 Prior to the 1980s, few felons were able to reclaim
their Second Amendment gun rights upon serving their sentence. Title IV
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Crime
Control Act) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted . . . of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year;
...
to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition[.]5
In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
(FOPA), which allowed states to restore felons’ civil rights. Yet, FOPA
would trump state law under certain circumstances. FOPA amended Title
IV of the Crime Control Act to define “a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”:

1

Throughout this short note, the term “felon” is used as an indication of status. All discussion of
“felons” refers to felons released from custody.
2
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2014).
3
U.S. Const. amend. II.
4
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
5
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
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What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be
determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in
which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has
been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been
pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless
such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that
the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.6
Therefore, if any state statute triggers the “unless clause” of Title IV,
federal statute preempts state law and felons of that state are not allowed
to possess or purchase firearms.
In Montana, the State restores felons’ gun rights once they have
served their sentences:
[I]f a person has been deprived of a civil or constitutional
right by reason of conviction for an offense and the person’s
sentence has expired or the person has been pardoned, the
person is restored to all civil rights and full citizenship, the
same as if the conviction had not occurred.7
Montana’s re-instatement of these rights is constitutionally and
statutorily based.8
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1983, Frank Van der hule was convicted of sexual assault and
four counts of sexual intercourse without consent. 9 He was sentenced to
25 years imprisonment.10 In 1993, Van der hule was paroled, and in 1999
he received a “Final Discharge” notice stating his civil rights were
restored.11 In 2003, Van der hule attempted to purchase a firearm from a
firearms dealer in Montana.12 The dealer refused sale to Van der hule
after searching through the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NCIS) and concluding that under federal law, Van der hule was
precluded from receiving a Montana concealed weapons permit and
purchasing or possessing any firearms.13 Van der hule filed suit for
6

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added).
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–801(2).
8
Id.; Mont. Const. art. II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are restored by termination of state supervision for
any offense against the state.”).
9
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045; Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–502(1), (3); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45–5–503(1), (3). Under Montana law, both crimes are felonies punishable by imprisonment of not
less than four years.
10
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045.
11
Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d 1019, 1019 (Mont. 2009).
12
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045.
13
Id.
7
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declaratory judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 925A, asking the Attorney
General to approve his firearm purchase.14 In September 2007, the
district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, but
certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court.15 The district court
“asked whether, under Montana law . . . a sheriff has the discretion to
grant a concealed weapons permit to someone with a criminal history
similar to Van der hule’s.”16 The Montana Supreme Court accepted the
certified question on October 10, 2007.17 More than a year later, in
January 2009, the Montana Supreme Court answered that no felon was
permitted to have a concealed weapons permit.18
Subsequently, Van der hule amended his complaint and argued
that “federal and state law depriving him of his right to purchase a
firearm violate[d] the Second Amendment.”19 The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted the
government’s motion on the Second Amendment issue.20 The court held
that “Van der hule was prohibited by federal law from possessing or
receiving a firearm by virtue of his restriction on obtaining a Montana
concealed weapons permit and that Van der hule, by virtue of his prior
felony conviction, had no federal constitutional right to possess a
firearm.”21 Van der hule appealed.22
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals majority upheld the U.S.
District Court decision. Under Montana law, a local sheriff “shall issue”
a concealed weapons permit unless the applicant was convicted of a
felony. The statute describing the permit describes that this:
privilege may not be denied an applicant unless the
applicant . . .
has been convicted in any state or federal court of:
(i) a crime punishable by more than 1 year of
incarceration; or
14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d at 1020.
18
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1045 (citing Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d 1019).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1045–1046.
22
Id. at 1046.
15
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(ii) regardless of the sentence that may be imposed, a
crime that includes as an element of the crime an act,
attempted act, or threat of intentional homicide,
serious bodily harm, unlawful restraint, sexual
abuse, or sexual intercourse or contact without
consent.23
The majority opined that this Montana law restricting felons from
obtaining a concealed weapons permit was enough of a restriction on the
right to possess firearms to trigger the “unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(20).24
The court used Caron v. United States to assess how the “unless
clause” is activated.25 In Caron, a Massachusetts felon served his time
and was restored his civil rights pursuant to Massachusetts law.26
However, Caron was unable to obtain a license to carry because of his
felony record.27 After his unsuccessful attempt to get a valid permit,
Caron was convicted of carrying a rifle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922.28
He appealed the conviction pursuant to his state’s civil right restoration
statute.29 The First Circuit concluded that the inability to obtain a
Massachusetts license to carry was sufficient to trigger the “unless
clause” and bar him from possessing any firearms under federal law.30
Caron appealed, and the United States Supreme Court held that the
phrase “may not . . . possess . . . firearms” in § 922(g) must be
interpreted under an “all-or-nothing” approach.31 The Supreme Court
determined that the legislative intent was “to keep guns away from all
offenders who, the Federal Government feared, might cause harm, even
if those persons were not deemed dangerous by States.”32
The Ninth Circuit found Van der hule’s case almost identical to
Caron. The only difference was Massachusetts permitted felons to own
firearms, including rifles, shotguns, and handguns, but they could not
carry the handguns outside of their home or business, while Montana
allowed felons to carry firearms, but restricted them from obtaining a
permit to carry concealed handguns.33 Montana’s scheme was less
restrictive than Massachusetts’s.34 Thus, Montana did not restrict what

23

Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–321(1)(c)(i–ii) (emphasis added).
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1051.
Id. at 1048 (citing Caron v. U.S., 524 U.S. 308 (1998)).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1048.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1049.
34
Id.
24
25
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firearms a prior felon could carry, but did limit the way in which a felon
can possess firearms.35
The court further held that although the word “possession” was
ambiguous, the U.S. Supreme Court defined possession of a firearm as
“the power to control and the intent to control.”36 Because Montana
limited the way felons could carry a handgun, the limitation was
sufficient under the Supreme Court’s definition of “possession” since it
regulated a felon’s power to control and intent to control his or her
firearms. For the court, this constraint was sufficient to trigger the
“unless clause.”37 Further, the court found Van der hule’s Second
Amendment argument unsubstantiated. The Ninth Circuit had already
concluded § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment.38
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit improperly held that § 921(a)(20)’s “unless
clause” was triggered by Montana’s concealed weapons statute. The
court stretched the federal statute too far by concluding that once a state
deems a felon too dangerous to be able obtain a concealed weapons
permit, then all felons are too dangerous to possess firearms in any
context. The court quickly dismissed Van der hule’s argument that the
phrasing “may not . . . possess” did not reach to concealment as a matter
of possession.39 Through a textual reading of the Montana statute, the
legislature, very explicitly, did not restrict re-instatement of felon gun
rights. Quite the opposite, the statute reads: “the person is restored to all
civil rights and full citizenship, the same as if the conviction had not
occurred.”40 Montana wanted felons, who have properly served their
sentences, to live again as citizens of the State.
Understandably, the concern in America is whether a violent
felon should be classified differently than a less violent felon. In Britt v.
North Carolina41, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of a
particular felon’s right to possess firearms.42 After this 2009 decision, a
wave of confusion ensued: Did this court decision extend to other felons?
35

Id. (emphasis in original).
Van der hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d at 1049 (citing United States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1310
(9th Cir. 1979)).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1050–1051 (citing United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)).
39
Id.
40
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–18–801(2).
41
Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009).
42
Deborah Bone, Comment: The Heller Promise Versus the Heller Reality: Will Statutes Prohibiting
the Possession of Firearms by Ex-felons be Upheld After Britt v. State?, 100 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1633, 1639–1640 (2010) (citing Britt, 681 S.E.2d 320 (holding that that a state statute
prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons could not reasonably be applied to a felon
who had an uncontested record of lifelong nonviolence, thirty years of law-abiding conduct since his
crime, and seventeen years of responsible, lawful firearm possession before the statute was enacted).
36
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What type of felons were allowed re-instatement of their gun rights?
Should other states follow suit?43 Clearly, to consider the felon’s history
of “responsible, lawful firearm possession” and consider some “absence
of lawlessness and dangerousness” for each individual felon is tedious.44
Yet, the Britt majority believed citizens’ “right to keep and bear arms” is
fundamental and did not want to paint all felons with the same brush.
Since Mr. Britt was convicted of a non-violent crime, had a long history
of lawfulness, and had always safely possessed firearms, the Court did
not see him as a threat to public safety and allowed him to possess
firearms.45
The Britt dissent found a prohibition on felon gun rights
reasonable because “one who has committed a felony has displayed a
degree of lawlessness that makes it entirely reasonably for the
legislature, concerned for the safety of the public it represents, to want to
keep firearms out of the hands of such a person.”46 The Ninth Circuit
agreed. Rather than try to decipher whether a particular felon was able to
possess firearms or obtain a concealed weapons permit, the federal
judiciary wrongly laid a blanket ban over all Montana felons’ gun rights.
While the Britt decision had no direct effect on federal law, it
should have persuaded other states to follow suit. This is especially true
for Montana—a strong pro-gun state. Even though the process of
determining individual felons’ worthiness to possess firearms may be
grueling, it is well worth it to uphold our state’s constitutional right to
bear arms.
Moreover, Van der hule is flawed because the Ninth Circuit
analyzed Montana law to fall within the “unless clause.” If the court had
decided Montana’s limitation on felons’ ability to carry a concealed
weapon did not reach “possession” of firearms as a matter of law, there
would be no preemption issue. When states, like Montana, explicitly
codify felons’ civil right re-instatement, a minor state regulation on the
way felons can carry firearms should not result in a comprehensive
prohibition on all firearm possession. As such, the court should have
interpreted the “unless clause” more narrowly, so no conflict between
Montana law and federal law existed.
VI. CONCLUSION
After this Ninth Circuit decision, Montana felons who wish to
possess guns will never be able to. If other states take on Van der hule’s
approach, the “unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) will continue to
eat away at state re-instatement of felons’ civil rights.
43

Id. at 1642.
Id.
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323.
46
Id. at 324 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
44
45

